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Abstract—In recent years, there has been a growing interest in
developing countermeasures against non zero-effort attacks for
speaker verification systems. Until now, the focus has been on
logical access attacks, where the spoofed samples are injected
into the system through a software-based process. This paper
investigates a more realistic type of attack, referred to as physical
access or presentation attacks, where the spoofed samples are
presented as input to the microphone. To detect such attacks,
we propose a binary classifier based approach that uses long-
term spectral statistics as feature input. Experimental studies on
the AVspoof database, which contains presentation attacks based
on replay, speech synthesis and voice conversion, shows that the
proposed approach can yield significantly low detection error
rate with a linear classifier (half total error rate of 0.038%).
Furthermore, an investigation on Interspeech 2015 ASVspoof
challenge dataset shows that it is equally capable of detecting
logical access attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems can achieve
a high accuracy in the presence of zero-effort impostors, i.e.,
speakers that simply attempt to be accepted by the system
as another person while using their own voice. However,
these systems have been shown to be vulnerable to more
elaborated attacks if no countermeasures are implemented [1].
Presentation attacks, also called spoofing attacks, refer to the
presentation of falsified or altered samples to a biometric
sensor to induce illegitimate acceptance. In this paper, we
investigate how to differentiate genuine accesses from the three
types of presentation attacks that represent a real threat to ASV
systems: replay, voice conversion and speech synthesis.
There has recently been an increasing amount of research on
developing countermeasures against attacks to ASV systems, a
review of some of them can be found in [2]. A display of this
trend is the high participation to the “Automatic Speaker Veri-
fication Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge” [3] during
the 2015 edition of Interspeech. The ASVspoof database, used
for this challenge, is one of the largest database in attack
detection and contains voice conversion and speech synthesis
attacks executed via logical access (point 2 in Figure 1).
For such attacks, it is assumed that the spoofed samples can
directly be injected into the system through a software-based
process.
However, according to the ISO standard 30107-1 [4], a
presentation attack is performed via physical access, i.e., at
the sensor level (point 1 in Figure 1). Indeed, an attacker is
unlikely to have access to the system’s software. In a more
realistic setup, the attacker plays back a recorded utterance
to the system. This utterance can either be directly obtained
from the real speaker or can be forged with voice conversion
or speech synthesis algorithms.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we de-
velop, to the best of our knowledge, the first countermeasures
against attacks performed via physical access. To do so, we
use the AVspoof database [1]. Secondly, we employ a novel
feature representation, which is based on statistics of the log
magnitude spectrum and can be easily classified with a linear
classifier to detect both physical and logical access attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives a brief background on Presentation Attack Detection
(PAD). Section III then motivates and present the proposed ap-
proach of using long-term spectral statistics for PAD. Section
IV describes the database and the experimental setup. Section
V presents the results and finally Section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
There are four ways of attacking an ASV system: imper-
sonation, replay, speech synthesis and voice conversion. Im-
personation, which refers to the human mimicking of another
voice, has been shown to not pose a real threat [5]. Thus, this
paper focuses on the three other types of attacks.
Replay is the most feasible attack as the attacker only needs
a record and play device. In the literature, detection of replay
attacks has largely focused on characteristics related to channel
noise and reverberation [6], [7].
For speech synthesis and voice conversion, as mentioned
in the introduction, we need to differentiate between attacks
performed via logical and physical access, also referred to as
indirect and direct attacks, respectively. Logical access attacks
correspond to the point 2 in Figure 1. It is assumed that the
attackers have hacked into the system to directly inject the
spoofed samples. On the other hand, physical access attacks,
which correspond to point 1 in Figure 1, are performed at the
Fig. 1. Potential points of attack in a biometric system, as defined in the ISO-
standard 30107-1. Points 1 and 2 correspond respectively to attacks performed
via physical access and via logical access.
sensor level. The attackers play the samples directly to the
system’s microphone. Attacks via physical access are more
likely to happen as they require less technical expertise.
There is a fair amount of literature on the detection of
logical access attacks with synthetic speech [2]. The methods
to detect such attacks, whether generated by voice conversion
or speech synthesis algorithms, have mainly focused on the
use of features such as the signal phase [8], [9], cepstral
coefficients [10]–[12], pitch patterns [13], [14] or the long-
term modulation spectrum [15]. There are also approaches
that are based on the detection of “pop noise” [16]. How-
ever, the lack of databases and standard protocols renders
the comparison between these systems difficult [17]. The
ASVspoof 2015 Challenge was designed to palliate to this
issue by proposing such a common framework. Thus, this
challenge is the best source to compare performance for the
detection of attacks performed via logical access. Among
the 16 teams that participated in this challenge, the one that
achieved the best performance used features related to cochlear
filter cepstral coefficients, instantaneous frequency and Mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients classified with a Gaussian Mix-
ture Model (GMM) [18]. In a more recent work [19], these
features were augmented with source-related features such as
the fundamental frequency and the strength of excitation, and
were found to be beneficial. A performance comparison of 19
features on the ASVspoof database can be found in [20].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no re-
search yet on speech synthesis and voice conversion attacks
performed via physical access besides a performance study
evaluating state-of-the-art PAD systems, which were originally
developed for the detection of logical access attacks, on
physical access attacks [21].
III. PROPOSED APPROACH: LONG-TERM SPECTRAL
STATISTICS BASED PAD
In this section, we first motivate the use of long-term
spectral statistics based features for PAD, and then present
the proposed approach.
A. Motivation
In automatic speech processing, spectral statistics are em-
ployed for various purposes. The Long Term Average Spec-
trum (LTAS) is used in the clinical domain as a voice qual-
ity measurement. It is employed for example for the early
detection of voice pathology [22] or Parkinson disease [23]
or for evaluating the effect of speech therapy or surgery on
the voice quality [24]. In addition to assessing voice quality,
LTAS has also been used to investigate voice characteristics.
For example, to differentiate between speakers gender [25]
and speakers age [26], and also to study singers and actors
voices [27], [28].
Voice quality is an informative measure for PAD. The
first information it can bring is the channel degradation. For
any presentation attack, playing the spoofed sample through
loudspeakers could affect the signal quality. In replay attacks,
the noise introduced by the microphone during the recording
of the original sample could further affect the quality. The
second type of information a voice quality measure can bring
is the naturalness of the speech. When listening to synthetic
speech, one can observe that the speech though intelligible is
still far from sounding natural. Indeed, artificially-generated
speech introduces some artefacts into the signal. From these
two elements, namely, channel degradation and naturalness,
we can expect that voice quality related features could yield
better discrimination between genuine accesses and presenta-
tion attacks, whether it is replay, speech synthesis or voice
conversion attacks.
The long-term spectral statistics are also used to build robust
speech and speaker recognition systems. Specifically, state-
of-the-art speech and speaker recognition systems employ
Cepstral Mean Normalization (CMN) [29] and Cepstral Vari-
ance Normalization (CVN) [30] to handle channel variability.
Formally, the cepstrum is the Fourier transform of the log
magnitude spectrum [31], [32]. Thus, the mean and variance of
the log magnitude spectrum is indicative of channel variability,
which is a desirable feature for PAD.
In summary, as spectral statistics can be indicative of voice
quality as well as channel variability, we hypothesize that they
can be used to develop countermeasures against presentation
attacks. In the following section, we propose an approach
along that line.
B. Approach
The proposed approach consists of extracting long-term
spectral statistics and using them as feature input to a classifier
to detect presentation attacks.
In order to extract long-term spectral statistics, we split the
input utterance or speech signal x into M frames using a frame
size of wl samples and a frame shift of ws samples. We first
pre-emphasize each frame to enhance the high frequencies, and
then compute the N -point Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT)
F , i.e., for frame m, m ∈ {1 · · ·M}:
Xm[k] = F(xm[n]), (1)
where n = 0 · · ·N − 1, with N = 2dlog2(wl)e, and k =
0 · · · N2 −1, since the signal is symmetric around N2 in the fre-
quency domain. For each frame m, this process yields a vector
of DFT coefficientsXm = [Xm[0] · · ·Xm[k] · · ·Xm[N2 −1]]T.
Next, given the sequence of DFT coefficient vectors
{X1, · · ·Xm, · · ·XM}, we compute the mean µ[k] and the
standard deviation σ[k] over the M frames of the log magni-
tude of the DFT coefficients:
µ[k] =
1
M
M∑
m=1
log |Xm[k]|, (2)
σ2[k] =
1
M
M∑
m=1
(log |Xm[k]| − µ[k])2, (3)
for k = 0 · · · N2 − 1. If |Xm[k]| < 1, we floor it to 1, i.e., we
set |Xm[k]| = 1 so that the log spectrum is always positive.
This procedure yields one single vector representation per
utterance, consisting of the mean and standard deviation. The
single vector is subsequently fed into a binary classifier to
decide if the utterance is a genuine input or an attack. In the
present work, we investigate two classifiers: a linear classifier
based on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and a Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The development of this system is based on the open-source
toolbox Bob [33] and QuickNet1 and all the experiments are
reproducible.2
A. Databases and protocol
Even though our interest lies in physical access attacks
rather than logical access attacks, for the sake of completeness
we also present studies on logical access attacks. We use the
Audio-Visual Spoofing (AVspoof) database for the physical
access attacks study and the Automatic Speaker Verification
Spoofing (ASVspoof) database for the logical access attacks
study. In the remainder of this section, we describe the two
databases along with their specific protocols.
1) AVspoof: The AVspoof database3 [1] contains replay
attacks, as well as speech synthesis and voice conversion
attacks both produced via logical access and physical access.
As explained in the introduction, in this paper we only consider
the physical accesses, a.k.a. presentation attacks. This database
contains the recordings of 31 male and 13 female participants
divided into four sessions. Each session is recorded in different
environments and different setups. For each session, there are
three types of speech: “reading” (pre-defined sentences read
by the participants), “pass-phrase” (short prompts) and “free
speech” (the participants talk freely for 3 to 10 minutes).
Free speech is only used in the training and development
phases. However, it is not used when testing the system, as it
is not realistic to have someone speaking for 3 to 10 minutes
to login into the system.
The attacks are played with four different loudspeakers:
the loudspeakers of the ASV system, external high-quality
loudspeakers, the loudspeakers of a Samsung Galaxy S4 and
the loudspeakers of an IPhone 3GS. For the replay attacks,
the original samples are recorded with: the microphone of the
ASV system, a good-quality microphone AT2020USB+, the
1http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/Speech/qn.html
2source code: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.biosig2016
3publicly available at https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
TABLE I
NUMBER OF SPEAKERS AND UTTERANCES FOR EACH SET OF THE
AVSPOOF DATABASE: TRAIN, DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION.
data set speakers utterances
male female genuine replay synthesis conversion
train 10 4 4973 2800 980 34800
development 10 4 4995 2800 980 34800
evaluation 11 5 4376 3200 1120 39000
microphone of a Samsung Galaxy S4 and the microphone of
an IPhone 3GS. This enables the database to be more general
as different devices do not affect the signal in the same manner.
The data is divided into three subsets, each containing a set
of non-overlapping speakers: the training set, the development
set and the evaluation set, presented in Table I. The training
set is used to optimize the parameters of the classifier. The
development set is used to choose the threshold that yields
an Equal Error Rate (EER), i.e., the false acceptance rate and
the false rejection rate are equal. Finally, the evaluation set
is used to assess the performance of the system once all the
parameters and hyper-parameters values are fixed. We evaluate
the performance of our system with the Half Total Error Rate
(HTER) computed on the evaluation set.
2) ASVspoof: The ASVspoof4 database contains genuine
and spoofed samples from 45 male and 61 female speak-
ers. This database contains only speech synthesis and voice
conversion attacks produced via logical access, i.e., they are
directly injected in the system. The attacks in this database
were generated with 10 different speech synthesis and voice
conversion algorithms. Out of which only 5 types of attacks
(S1 to S5) are in the training and development sets, while all
the 10 types of attacks (S1 to S10) are in the evaluation set.
This allows to evaluate the systems on known (S1 to S5) and
unknown attacks (S6 to S10). The evaluation protocol involves
the estimation of EER independently for each type of attack.
Then, the performance of the system is evaluated by averaging
the EER over the known attacks (S1-S5), the unknown attacks
(S6-S10) and all the attacks. The full description of the
database and the evaluation protocol is given in [3].
B. System
In this section, we present the details of the PAD system
based on the proposed approach.
1) Preprocessing: In the case of presentation attacks
(AVspoof dataset), there is an indicative noise at the beginning
and end of the utterance. This noise corresponds to the laps
of time during which the button to play and stop the sequence
is pressed. Even though presence of such noise could be
indicative of presentation attacks, we did not want our system
to be biased and to rely on these portions to differentiate
between real accesses and attacks. To remove these segments
at the beginning and the end of the utterance, we used an
energy-based Voice Activity Detection (VAD) algorithm. The
energy values are computed over frames of 20ms with an
overlap of 10ms, normalized and then classified into two
4http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/ds/298
classes: speech and silence. In the case of logical access
attacks (ASVspoof dataset), there is no such needs. So, we
did not perform any preprocessing.
2) Feature extraction: The only hyper-parameters in our
feature extraction scheme, as defined in Eqn. (2) and Eqn.
(3), are: the frame size, the frame shift and the pre-emphasis
coefficient applied to each frame to enhance the high frequen-
cies.
The underlying idea of the proposed approach is that the
attacks could be detected based on long-term spectral statistics.
It is well known that when applying Fourier transform there
is a trade-off between time and frequency resolution, i.e., the
smaller the frame size, the lower the frequency resolution and
the larger the frame size, the higher the frequency resolution.
So, the frame size affects the estimation of spectral statistics.
In the case of detecting presentation attacks, our interest
primarily lies in exploiting the effect of channel on the speech
signal. The channel information can be presumed to be spread
across different frequencies. Thus, frequency resolution may
not be crucial. In other words, conventional short-term speech
processing can be sufficient. So, we use parameters values that
are very common in speech processing: frame size of 32ms
and frame shift of 10ms.
In the case of logical attacks, however, the spoofed speech
signal is directly injected into the system and there is no
channel effect like for the presentation attacks. So, frequency
resolution could be important in this case. We determined the
frame size based on cross validation, while keeping the frame
shift and pre-emphasis coefficient the same as in the case of
presentation attacks. More precisely, we varied the frame size
from 32 ms to 512 ms and chose the frame size that yielded
the lowest EER on the ASVspoof development data. It was
found that frame size of 256 ms yields 0% of EER.
3) Classifier: We investigated two classifiers, namely, a
linear classifier based on LDA and a non-linear classifier
based on MLP. The input to the classifiers are the spectral
statistics estimated at utterance level as given in Equation (2)
and Equation (3), i.e., one input feature vector per utterance.
LDA: the input features are projected onto one dimension
with LDA and we directly use the values as scores.
MLP: For AVspoof, we use an MLP with one hidden layer
composed of 200 units and for ASVspoof with one hidden
layer composed of 1000 units. The difference in the number
of hidden units is primarily due to the fact that the input feature
dimension in the case of ASVspoof (based on DFT of 256 ms)
is larger than AVspoof (based on DFT of 32 ms). The MLP
classifier was trained using the back propagation algorithm
with early stopping criteria.
V. RESULTS
A. Physical access attacks
Table II presents the results for the detection of presentation
attacks on the evaluation set of the AVspoof database in
terms of HTER as well as the number of misclassified attacks
and genuine accesses to give further insights into the system
performance.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE ON THE EVALUATION SET OF THE AVSPOOF DATABASE.
feature algorithm HTER misclassified attacks / genuine
µ LDA 0.263% 10 / 22
MLP 0.057% 20 / 3
σ LDA 2.753% 831 / 157
MLP 1.927% 383 / 130
[µ, σ] LDA 0.038% 13 / 2
MLP 0.049% 23 / 2
We observe that, whether the classification is done with a
MLP or a LDA classifier, the long term spectral average clearly
outperforms the standard deviation. However, the fusion of
the two features lowers the error rate. When we compare
the performance of using the feature-level fusion of the mean
and standard deviation with a MLP or with a LDA, we see
that the LDA classifier slightly outperforms the MLP. This
shows that the features based on long term spectral statistics
are highly discriminative and can be simply classified using a
linear classifier to detect presentation attacks.
In [21], the authors have benchmarked state-of-the-art sys-
tems, which were originally proposed for the detection of
logical access attacks, on the AVspoof database. The lowest
HTER obtained on the evaluation set was 2.70%. This was
achieved by extracting 20 dimensional Rectangular Filter
Cepstral Coefficients with their first and second derivatives
from short-term speech signal and using a GMM of 512
components to classify these features. It can be observed that
all the proposed systems, i.e., µ only, σ only and [µ, σ], yield
better performance than that.
B. Comparative study on logical access attacks
Table III compares the systems based on our approach
against the five best systems (denoted as System ID A-E)
proposed in the ASVspoof 2015 challenge [3]. The ASVspoof
2015 challenge systems typically employed multiple features
and fusion techniques. For example, the team that achieved the
best performance [18] used a fusion of cochlear filter cepstral
coefficients, instantaneous frequency and Mel-frequency cep-
stral coefficients, classified with a GMM. Similarly, the second
best system [34] employed fusion of multiple features based
on Mel-frequency cepstrum and phase spectrum; transforming
them into i-vectors; and finally classifying the i-vectors with
a support vector machine. More information can be found in
the respective citations provided in the table.
We built two systems using [µ, σ] as the feature input,
namely, LDA-based and MLP-based. On average, both sys-
tems perform better than the ones proposed in the ASVspoof
2015 challenge. It can be observed that the LDA-based ap-
proach yields one of the lowest error rates for both Known and
Unknown attacks scenario. However, the MLP-based approach
yields a high error rate in the Known attacks scenario and a
low error rate in the Unknown attacks scenario.
Table IV presents the performance of our approach for each
type of attack. We can observe a trend similar to AVspoof, i.e.,
the LDA classifier based system outperforms MLP classifier
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE ON THE ASVSPOOF 2015 CHALLENGE DATA SET IN
TERMS OF EER. FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES, FIVE BEST PERFORMANCES
INDICATED AS SYSTEMS A-E WERE TAKEN FROM [3].
Equal Error Rates (EERs)
System ID Known attacks Unknown attacks Average
A [18] 0.408 2.013 1.211
B [34] 0.008 3.922 1.965
C [35] 0.058 4.998 2.528
D [36] 0.003 5.231 2.617
E [37] 0.041 5.347 2.694
Proposed approach: LDA 0.026 2.086 1.056
Proposed approach: MLP 0.270 0.781 0.525
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH ON EACH ATTACK IN TERMS
OF EER.
Known attacks S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
LDA 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.086
MLP 0.043 0.234 0.022 0.032 1.019
Unknown attacks S6 S7 S8 S9 S10
LDA 0.086 0.030 0.083 0.032 10.197
MLP 0.744 0.118 0.054 0.202 2.787
based system for all attacks except for S10, which is still an
issue for most of the approaches proposed in the literature.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an approach to detect non zero-effort
attacks on speaker verification systems based on long-term
spectral statistics. Even though the main focus of this paper
was on physical access attacks, we also studied logical access
attack detection in order to relate to existing works. Our
investigations showed that the proposed approach yields a
very low error rate for both types of attacks and outperforms
existing systems. Specifically, for physical access attacks, the
approach achieves a HTER of 0.038% using a LDA and
0.049% using a MLP on the purpose-built AVspoof database.
For the detection of logical access attacks, we used the
ASVspoof 2015 Challenge data set and obtained an average
EER of 1.056% with LDA classifier based system and 0.525%
with MLP classifier based system.
Although the proposed approach scales well to both types of
attacks, the frame size used to compute the spectral statistics
is not the same: 32ms for physical attacks, 256ms for logical
attacks. Our original reasoning was that frequency resolution
may not matter for presentation attacks but may matter for
logical access attacks. In order to ascertain that, we analyzed
the LDA coefficients estimated for the different frequency
bins. We found that in the case of physical attacks, importance
is given to all frequency bins. This supports our assumption
that in presentation attacks, the channel effect will impact
the whole bandwidth, thus the relevant information is spread
across different frequency bins. However, in the case of logical
access attacks, importance is given to a few frequency bins that
are well below 50 Hz, i.e., discriminative information in the
frequency domain is highly localized. Thus, we consequently
need a higher frequency resolution.
To conclude, our study showed that physical and logical
attacks can be effectively detected using simple utterance level
long-term spectral statistics combined with a linear classifier.
This is particularly promising when considering the existing
approaches, which rely on complex feature extraction and
classifiers.
Our future work will focus on further investigating the
generalization capabilities of the proposed approach under
different mismatched conditions. For instance, training either
on presentation attacks or logical access attacks and evaluating
on the other.
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